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Over the last decade, the programming of smart cards has evolved significantly due to
the advent of high-level programming languages tailored to this application domain. In
particular, Java Card––a dialect of Java––has been designed with the limited resources of
smart cards in mind, while retaining the standard Java architecture with a virtual machine.
Smart cards find some of their most important applications in sectors such as finance
and health-care, where safety and security are important. Consequently, there is a high
demand for methods and tools that can assist in the development and validation of smart
card software. This has triggered a number of research projects on formal techniques (auto-
mated deduction, program analysis, model checking, etc.) for establishing whether a given
smart card application satisfies certain desired properties.
The European projects VERIFICARD and SECSAFE are concerned with formal meth-
ods for analysing and proving correctness of programs, with smart card software as privi-
leged application domain. These projects have held several VERISAFE workshops together.
The current special issue results from the workshop held in Nice in September 2002. The
articles in this special issue describe various results of the two projects.
The article by Siveroni presents an operational semantics of the Carmel language, a
synthesis of the Java Card byte code language, developed in the SECSAFE project. This
semantics provides a formal definition of card-specific language features such as transient
data and the applet firewall.
Klein and Strecker have focused on the byte code verification that takes place before an
applet is executed by the Java virtual machine. This verification is a fundamental part of
the security architecture of Java Card. They model it using the theorem prover ISABELLE
and in addition they show how to issue a type certificate that allows to verify the type
correctness of the compiled code.
Two articles deal with tools and techniques for reasoning about source-code level
Java Card programs, annotated using the JML specification language. Jacobs shows how
to reason using weakest preconditions within the LOOP tool, relying on the theorem prover
PVS. Marché et al. have developed the KRAKATOA tool for reasoning about JML-annotated
applets, which works by translating code into an intermediate representation in the Coq
proof assistant.
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The article by Jacobs et al. details a case study in applet verification using the LOOP
tool. They study a Java Card electronic purse applet that uses a challenge-response mecha-
nism. The verification relies on an encoding of a finite-state automaton in JML to represent
particular aspects of the applet’s behaviour.
Special thanks are due to the reviewers for their magnificent efforts. You have been
most helpful for putting together this special issue!
